Microfinance and Moneylender Interest Rate: Evidence from Bangladesh by Mallick, Debdulal
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Microfinance and Moneylender Interest
Rate: Evidence from Bangladesh
Debdulal Mallick
Deakin University
May 2009
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17800/
MPRA Paper No. 17800, posted 11. October 2009 08:42 UTC
  
Microfinance and Moneylender Interest Rate: Evidence from 
Bangladesh 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Debdulal Mallick* 
Deakin University and BRAC 
 
 
 
 
 
May, 2009 
 
 
 
 
*The author thanks Aldo Benini, Shyamal Chowdhury, Matthew Clarke, Cong Pham, 
Imran Matin, Bazle Razee, and Mehmet Ulubasoglu for their helpful comments, and 
Research and Evaluation Division, BRAC for making the data set available. All errors and 
omissions are the sole responsibility of the author, and the conclusions do not necessarily 
reflect the views of the organizations with which he is associated.  
 2 
Microfinance and Moneylender Interest Rate: Evidence from Bangladesh 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The linkage between the formal and informal credit markets has long been of great 
interest to development economists. This paper addresses one important aspect of the 
linkage by empirically investigating the impact of the microfinance program expansion 
on the moneylender interest rates in Bangladesh, and finds that moneylender interest rates 
increase with microfinance program expansion. MFI program expansion increases 
moneylender interest rates in the villages in which more loans are invested in productive 
economic activities than consumption. Borrowers resort to moneylenders for additional 
funds because of inadequate supply, unavailability of seasonal working capital from 
MFIs, and tight repayment schedule, which in turn increases demand for moneylender 
loans.  
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Microfinance and Moneylender Interest Rate: Evidence from Bangladesh 
 
1 Introduction 
Bangladesh has the largest operation of the microfinance
1
 program in the world 
with about 12.4 million active borrowers and over 629 microfinance institutions (MFIs) 
engaged in microfinance (World Bank 2003, p. 21). One of the arguments given for 
expanding the microfinance industry is to substitute for informal credit market
2
 and help 
poor people escape the clutches of „evil moneylenders‟ who allegedly charge usurious 
rates of interest (Meyer, 2002). This is a decade old problem for the policymakers in the 
developing countries. As early as in the 1950s the Indian government tried to provide 
positive institutional alternatives to the moneylenders (Bell, 1990). The linkage between 
the formal and informal credit markets has also been of great interest to development 
economists.  Morduch (1999, p. 1595) raises the question, “how will the existence of a 
subsidized program affect the profitability of both formal and informal institutions 
operating nearby?”  This paper addresses one important aspect of the linkage by 
empirically investigating the impact of the microfinance program expansion on the 
moneylender interest rates in Bangladesh.  
Recent theoretical development points out that the response of the interest rates in 
the informal sector to the expansion of the formal credit depends on the characteristics of 
both sectors such as market structure in the informal sector as well as repayment schedule 
of the formal sector. Hoff and Stiglitz (1993, 47-48; 1998) outline conditions under 
which increasing access to formal credit may increase or decrease interest rates in the 
informal sector. If some borrowers can satisfy all their borrowing needs from the formal 
sector at lower interest rates, there will be less demand for informal credit. Under perfect 
competition and perfect information, this would exert downward pressure on interest 
                                                 
1
 In this paper no distinction is made between “microfinance” and “microcredit” as microfinance operation 
is defined to include lending activities only.  
 
2
 Informal sector includes friends, relatives, neighbors, moneylenders, employers, input suppliers, and 
shopkeepers. Microfinance institutions (MFIs), government institutions, commercial banks, cooperatives, 
and other NGOs are defined as the formal sector (McKernan, Pitt and Moskowitz, 2005). 
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rates. But in a monopolistically competitive market
3
 with free entry and one moneylender 
being an imperfect substitute for another, a subsidy in the formal sector may cause the 
interest rates in the informal sector to rise because the induced new entry drives up the 
marginal enforcement cost of lending in the informal sector (Hoff and Stiglitz, 1998). 
Bose (1998) extends Hoff and Stiglitz (1998) by including heterogeneous agents who 
differ in their probability of default. The subsidized programs diminish optimal scale and 
siphon off the best borrowers. As a result, the informal lenders are left with a riskier pool 
of borrowers that leads to higher enforcement costs, and consequently they charge higher 
interest rates as risk premium. Jain (1999) reaches similar conclusion by considering a 
case in which scale advantages of the formal sector outweigh the informational 
advantages of local moneylenders, while Floro and Ray (1997) consider the case in which 
an expansion of formal credit may strengthen the ability of informal lenders to collude 
among themselves.  
Jain and Mansuri (2003) follow an entirely different route that resembles the 
present scenario in Bangladesh that a microfinance program may well have a “crowding-
in” effect on informal lenders. Under some circumstances this “crowding-in” effect might 
be strong enough to raise the interest rates in the informal sector. For example, the tight 
repayment schedule of MFIs (in Bangladesh the first weekly installment of MFI loans is 
due immediately) forces many borrowers to borrow from moneylenders to repay MFI 
loans. Borrowers also find difficult to finance long-gestation projects and even seasonal 
working capital needs for agricultural production by MFIs loans.  
Although there are numerous theoretical models that explain the interest rates in 
the informal sector as a result of MFI program expansion, empirical evidence is scant. To 
the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that investigates this linkage in the 
                                                 
3
 There is evidence that rural informal credit markets are not perfectly competitive. One celebrated study is 
by Aleem (1990) who studied services, costs, and charges of 14 informal market moneylenders and their 
clients in Chambar, Pakistan. His estimated the resource costs incurred by informal lenders for screening, 
pursuing delinquent loans, overhead, and cost of capital and found that lenders charge interest rates that are 
equal to their average cost of lending but exceed their marginal cost. His finding suggests that the informal 
credit market is characterized by monopolistic competition in the presence of imperfect information.  
Iqbal (1988) found evidence of the reduction of moneylender monopoly power in rural India as a result of 
increased competition from formal lending agencies. Kochar (1997, p. 366) obtained a negative but 
insignificant (statistically) coefficient of per capita formal credit on the probability of borrowing from 
informal sector, and concluded that a more thorough analysis of the relationship between formal and 
informal credit is warranted. 
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context of Bangladesh. This paper analyzes village level survey data from 156 villages in 
three districts in northern Bangladesh, and finds that moneylender interest rates increase 
with MFI program expansion. The interest rates are found to be higher in the villages 
where higher percentage of households borrows from MFIs after controlling uses of MFI 
and moneylender loans, adoption of modern agricultural production technology, quality 
of cultivable land, village level physical infrastructure, incidence of poverty, and a proxy 
for competition among moneylenders.  
We find that use of moneylender loan in productive purposes than consumption 
lowers interest rates. But MFI program expansion increases moneylender interest rates in 
the villages in which more loans are invested in productive activities. Productive use of 
loan lowers the default risk. On the other hand, since MFIs do not supply adequate 
amount for productive investment or for seasonal working capital, and repayment is 
required immediately after borrowing, borrowers resort to moneylenders for additional 
funds to sustain their projects. The increased demand raises moneylender interest rates. 
Although it is not our purpose to test competing theories, our empirical results favor Jain 
and Mansuri (2003) hypothesis. We cannot directly test the hypothesis because there is 
no variation in the repayment schedule of MFI loans; for all MFIs in Bangladesh maturity 
of loan is usually one year and borrowers are required to begin repayment immediately 
after loan is disbursed (usually after one or two weeks). It is also found that competition 
among moneylenders lowers interest rates. Interest rates are also higher in the villages 
located away from place of commercial activities. Results are robust to correction for 
endogeneity. 
The results have important policy implications. MFIs can enhance productive 
investment by borrowers by allowing more flexibility in loan disbursement and 
repayment schedule. Borrower projects will also be more profitable if MFIs expand their 
program of loan-only to loan-plus such as credit with skill development training, 
information and provision of inputs. On the other hand, competition between formal and 
informal lenders will increase borrowers‟ access to fund at competitive interest rates.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief literature 
review of the formal-informal linkages in the rural credit market in Bangladesh. Section 3 
discusses in detail the data collection methodology. Results are presented in section 4 that 
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include descriptive statistics, OLS and 3SLS estimation results. Finally, section 5 
concludes.  
 
2 Formal-informal linkages in credit market in rural Bangladesh  
 
Very little is known about the response of the informal lenders to the MFI 
program expansion. However, there is widespread evidence that MFI clients borrow from 
informal sources as part of their financial management strategy. Sinha and Matin (1998) 
report that about 87% of rural households in the northern Bangladesh borrow from 
informal sources and the percentage is higher among the MFI borrowers. Husain et al. 
(1998) find that 11.6% of borrowers from BRAC also borrowed from moneylenders. 
Zeller et al. (2001) report similar practices among the rural households in Bangladesh 
they surveyed in 1994.  MFI borrowers received 20% of their total debt outstanding from 
friends and relatives and another 18% from shopkeepers and other informal sources.  
McKernan, Pitt and Moskowitz (2005) document that during the 1998/99 time 
period, the informal sector was at least as important as the formal sector in Bangladesh. 
About 29% of the rural households received money (in the form of loan and gift) from 
the formal sector compared to 24% households receiving money from the informal 
sector. Average amount of money received from the informal sector was significantly 
larger than the average amount received from the formal sector. An average household 
received 2,125 Taka in formal loans, 1,440 Taka in informal loans, and 3,040 Taka in 
informal gifts. Only 6% of households received money from both sectors and 49% from 
either formal or informal sector.  Roughly 2% of rural households received credit from 
moneylenders, accounting for 23% of all non-relative credit and 9% of the informal credit 
received.  
Household consumption and payment of other loans are the two most frequently 
reported uses of the informal loans. Sinha and Matin (1998) point out that due to the large 
increase in MFI lending some internal cross-financing was taking place in which the 
proceeds from one loan were being used to repay another. Clients borrow from informal 
sources so they could maintain high repayment rates with MFIs and become eligible for 
larger future loans. Atique Rahman (1992) also provides evidence of similar practices. 
Aminur Rahman (1999) observes that MFI employees are expected to increase 
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disbursement of loans among their members and press for high recovery rates to earn 
profit necessary for economic viability of the institution. To ensure timely repayment in 
the loan, centers employees and borrowing peers inflict an intense pressure on women 
clients. Many borrowers maintain their regular repayment schedules through a process of 
loan recycling that considerably increases the debt-liability on the individual households, 
and increases tension and frustration among household members. Zeller et al. (2001) 
report that nine percent of the funds borrowed from informal sources were used to pay 
existing debt. Todd (1996) also describes the complex financial management practices of 
women members of the Grameen Bank. Clients borrow to pay moneylender and other 
informal loans, and borrow small sums informally to meet loan installments.  
 
3. Data collection 
Data were collected in 2002 from 156 villages in three districts in northern 
Bangladesh (Kurigram, Rangpur and Nilphamari) as part of the baseline survey for 
BRAC‟s CFPR/TUP (Challenging the Frontiers of Poverty Reduction– Targeting the 
Ultra Poor) program.
4
 Before launching the CFPR/TUP program on a pilot basis BRAC 
first needed to select the villages and the extreme poor therein. In the first step of the 
selection, BRAC‟s Research and Evaluation Division (RED) conducted Participatory 
Rural Appraisal (PRA) in the villages randomly selected to determine the extent of 
poverty and also to identify the extreme poor in the selected villages.
5
 Households 
initially selected by PRA were surveyed to cross-check the information gathered by PRA, 
and also to create a baseline for future program evaluation. Along with the baseline 
household survey, comprehensive village level information was collected by Focus 
Group Discussion (FGD)
6
. This paper uses village level survey data for all these villages. 
Note that the household survey was conducted only among the extreme poor selected by 
PRA and therefore does not represent the village population.  
                                                 
4
 The CFPR/TUP program is designed to target only the extreme poor whose poverty lasts long or 
throughout their entire life, and who even lack the opportunities for upward mobility through regular 
microfinance programs (Matin and Halder, 2004, p. 5).  
 
5
 For a detail description of this data collection method, see BRAC (2004). 
 
6
 Stewart and Shamdasani (1990), and Litosseliti (2003) provide nice discussions on Focus Group 
Discussion.  
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There were several preparatory stages before the FGD. The first stage was to 
build rapport with the community members. This was not difficult because in most 
situations the community members were already familiar with BRAC programs and staff. 
BRAC‟s Program Organizers walk around the community inviting people of all walks of 
life to the PRA meeting. The PRA sessions and the next household surveys enabled the 
research team to build good rapport with the community and to have a good idea about 
who to invite for the FGD. These are the people who are the most knowledgeable about 
the village. Given the type of issues to be covered in the FGD, members of different 
socio-economic background, age and occupation were selected. The group of invitees 
generally included school teachers, elected Union Parishad (smallest local administrative 
unit) members, health workers, students and MFI clients. Local bazaar, school or the well 
traveled place in the village was selected as the venue for the FGD. The size of the group 
ranged between 8 and 10. The group seated on chairs around a table so that maximum 
opportunity for eye contact is possible with both the moderator and other group members. 
If chairs were not available for everyone, the group sat on the ground making a circle. 
The moderator, who was a researcher from RED and also well trained in qualitative 
research and data collection, was fully aware of the fact that MFI clients are poor women 
and being borrowers they are less powerful in the community. The moderator encouraged 
them to freely express their opinion by explicitly asking them and by providing verbal 
rewards for such opinions. This was necessary because their responses are crucial for 
some information. They borrow from different sources including MFIs and moneylenders 
and have also close contacts with other MFI clients, and therefore they are better 
informed about the rural credit market. However, their responses were also discussed by 
other participants in the group and enumerated only after verification.  
A structured questionnaire was used to collect data because of the type of 
information sought and also for reliability and possibility of replication. At the beginning 
of the session, the moderator clearly specified the objective of the FGD and the type of 
information to be sought. It was also made clear at the outset that the FGD will continue 
for about two hours. However, in several occasions, all issues were not possible to cover 
in two hours so that discussions had to discontinue. Groups were not kept beyond 
schedule because it was perceived that impatience of the participants may lead to 
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inaccurate answers. Therefore, all information could not be collected from many villages; 
there are 89 villages for which data are available for all variables used in the regression.  
It is important to mention that more than one FGD were conducted in large 
villages because participants residing in one part of the village may not have the most 
accurate information about those residing in another part.  
 
4. Results  
This section presents OLS and endogeneity corrected results of the determinants 
of the moneylender interest rates. But first we present some descriptive statistics of the 
villages.  
  
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics of the villages considered in this 
study. In the sample villages, on average 3.9 MFIs have loan operation. The minimum 
and maximum numbers of MFIs working in a village are one and nine respectively. 
Average number of big MFIs
7
  is 3.6 with the minimum and maximum numbers being 
one and eight respectively. This indicates competition among the MFIs for clients even 
among the big ones. On average 33% of all households borrow from any MFI with a 
standard deviation of 19. The correlation between number of MFIs and percentage of 
client households is very high at 0.88.  
 
Insert Table 1 here 
 
In 32.7% of the villages, higher percentages of clients utilize MFI loans for any 
productive investment
8
 than consumption, and agriculture has been the predominant 
sector for investment. Conversely, in only 10% of the villages the primary use of 
                                                 
7
 These are Grameen Bank, BRAC, ASA, Proshika, BRDB, Bangladesh Agricultural Bank, RDRS, and 
Thengamara. The last two are big regional MFIs working only in the northern Bangladesh.  
 
8
 This includes any type of investment that generates future steam of income both in the short and long run 
such as crop production, small business, buying power tiller, bullock (for ploughing) or cow, giving bribe 
to manage job for family members and so on. 
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moneylender loans was any productive investment. Productive investment is the highest 
in nearly 60% of the villages for the commercial bank loans.  
In about 27% of the villages, poverty situation improved and in 17% of the 
villages it remained the same in last five years. In about 35% of the villages the situation 
deteriorated severely. The number of casual daily laborer in the agricultural sector 
increased in 71% of the villages and it decreased in only about 15% of the villages.  
Increasing incidences of females going out of home for work were reported in 56.7% of 
the villages, while it decreased only in 2.7% of the villages. However, the reason cannot 
be verified from data; it may be due to greater women empowerment or increased 
poverty. Average daily male and female wage rates (wage rates are averaged over three 
cropping seasons) are Taka 44 and 30 respectively.  
  The moneylender interest rates vary considerably with a mean of 103.33% and 
standard deviation of 59.06. The minimum and maximum interest rates are 10% and 
240% respectively. These are the averages of annual moneylender interest rates in a 
village. 
 
4.2 Determinants of moneylender interest rates 
 
OLS estimation: 
In this section, we report results from multivariate regression analysis. The 
dependent variable is the average annual moneylender interest rates. There may be 
variations in the interest rates within a village that we cannot exploit. The estimation 
equation is  
 = _i i iInterML MFI Cover    iγZ   --- (1) 
where iInterML  is the average moneylender interest rate in village i, _ iMFI Cover  is 
percentage of households borrowing from MFIs in village i (MFI coverage),
9
 iZ  is a 
vector of other control variables, and i  is i.i.d. error term.  
                                                 
9
 Since both variables are in percentage,   is interpreted as percentage points change in moneylender 
interest rates for one percentage point increase in MFI client households.  
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As mentioned above, the correlation between percentage of households borrowing 
from MFIs and the number of MFIs lending in a village is 0.88, therefore to avoid 
multicolinearity the latter variable is not included in iZ .  The interest rate on MFI loans 
is also excluded. The reason is that MFIs charge the same interest rate to all borrowers, 
and there is also little variation in the interest rates among the MFIs.   
Average daily male and female wage rates are used as proxy for current poverty 
situation in the village. Change in the incidence of poverty in last five years is also 
alternatively used to check robustness.  Ghatak (1983, p. 32) finds that interest rates on 
informal loans depend on the poverty level. Average rural interest rates for different 
classes such as casual laborers, tenants and agricultural laborers varied between 36-84% 
per year in a relatively more prosperous district like Burdwan in West Bengal in India, 
while it averaged between 72-120% in a relatively poor district like Nadia.  
We include percentage of cultivable land that grows one, two, and three crops a 
year as proxies for soil quality, and percentage of land irrigated using electricity as a 
proxy for adoption of modern agricultural production technology. The latter variable 
reflects the opportunity for productive investment in agriculture. Main use of both MFI 
and moneylender loans (1 = investment, 0 = consumption), on the other hand, capture 
realization of any such opportunity. Iqbal (1988) finds in the context of India that 
moneylender interest rates are influenced by a host of borrower and environmental 
characteristics. Borrower‟s profit potential as measured by farm size, soil quality and 
even farmer‟s education are important consideration for moneylenders. Farmers residing 
in areas characterized by the use and/or provision of new technology face lower interest 
rates.   
The other controls in iZ  are several measures of village level infrastructure that 
include distance of the center of the village from the nearest bank, bazaar, bus stop, all 
weather (pucca) road, percentage of households with electricity connection, and number 
of shops in the village. It is argued that MFI program placement is not random (de 
Aghion and Morduch, 2005, p. 223). Village level infrastructure and other controls 
previously mentioned are intended to account for this non-randomness. A complete list of 
variables is provided in Appendix.  
 12 
We estimate equation (1) by OLS with different combinations of the variables in 
iZ . To account for the village level heterogeneity, we report the White (1980) 
heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors. Results are reported in Table 2. Column 2 
reports the results for the simple regression when iZ  is excluded from equation (1). The 
coefficient of MFI coverage is 1.1 and significant at any conventional level implying that 
one percentage point increase in MFI borrowers in a village increases the average 
moneylender interest rates by 1.1 percentage points. This variable alone can explain 14% 
variation in the moneylender interest rates. In columns 3, use of moneylender and MFI 
loans are included. Column 4 includes incidence of poverty. The magnitude and 
significance of MFI coverage remains the same in all specifications. However, it 
decreases to 0.85 with 5% level of significance if changes in poverty in last five years 
instead of male and female wage rates are used (column 5). The coefficients of both 
moneylender and MFI loan use enter negatively but are not significant. We also find that 
moneylender interest rates are higher in the villages where higher percentage of land 
irrigated using electricity.  
 
Insert Table 2 here 
 
Competition among the moneylenders can also influence interest rates in both 
directions. If the informal credit market is characterized by perfect competition, 
competition among moneylenders drives down interest rates. On the other hand, loss of 
economies of scale can result in higher interest rates. We do not have direct measure for 
such competition. Moneylending activities in the rural areas, to a large extent, are 
controlled by large landowners (Bell, 1990, p. 306; Hoff and Stiglitz, 1998, p. 488). 
Information on the number of moneylenders or large landowners in a village is not 
available. In rural Bangladesh, land market has become more polarized than in the past as 
the number of landless or marginal landholders is increasing (Rahman, and Manprasert, 
2006, p. 54). Taslim and Ahmed (1992, p. 617) in their study villages in Bangladesh 
found a positive association between percentage of large landowners and tenants who are 
usually landless or marginal landowners. Information about the number of households 
owning no more than 10 decimal of land was collected by PRA and the follow-up survey 
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to select the TUP participants. We exploit this information to calculate percentage of 
households owning no more than 10 decimal of land, which is used as a proxy for 
number of moneylenders. The idea is that there are more large landowners and thus more 
moneylenders in the villages in which higher percentages of households are landless and 
marginal landowners. Results after controlling for competition among moneylenders, 
reported in columns 4a-5a, confirm robustness of previous results. The coefficient of 
competition is negative but significance is not robust to alternative measures of poverty.  
It is also found that moneylender interest rates are higher in the village located away from 
bazaar, the place of commercial activities in the rural areas.  
The results are also robust to different combinations of control variables in iZ . 
Results do not also change if distance of high school from the center of the village, which 
can be a proxy for the general education level in the village, is included. The coefficient 
of this variable is negative but not significant (not reported).  
To comprehend why moneylender interest rates are higher in the villages with 
higher MFI coverage, we include interaction of MFI coverage with use of MFI and 
moneylender loans, and percentage of land irrigated using electricity.  
 
1 2
3 4
 = _ _ *
     _ * _ *
i i i i
i i i i i
InterML MFI Cover MFI Cover UseML
MFI Cover UseMFL MFI Cover ElectIri
  
  
 
   iγZ
 --- (2) 
 
Results are reported in Table 3. This equation is estimated alternatively using current and 
past poverty situations, and also with and without competition among moneylenders. The 
coefficient of MFI coverage ranges between 1.1 and 1.4 and robustly significant as 
before. One important change in the results is that the coefficient of moneylender loan 
use is now robustly significant (and negative).  This implies that if loans are utilized in 
productive purposes, moneylenders lower interest rates because of lower default risk by 
borrowers. The interaction of MFI coverage with moneylender loan use enters positively 
and is significant at 1% level. This result in conjunction with the previous result implies 
that although productive use of loan lowers moneylender interest rates, in the villages 
with large MFI coverage interest rates increase because of increased demand for fund. In 
addition to inadequate supply of loan, MFIs allow little or no flexibility in loan 
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disbursement so that seasonal working capital is difficult to finance by MFI loans. 
Repayment schedule is also very rigid as first installment is due immediately after loan 
disbursement so borrowers in many instances save a portion of loan for installment. As a 
consequence, more loans are demanded from moneylenders to sustain the project, which 
in turn raises moneylender interest rates.  
 
Insert Table 3 here 
Percentage of land irrigated using electricity is significantly positive as before, 
and its interaction with MFI coverage is negative and significant.  
 
System of simultaneous equations estimation:  
Higher moneylender interest rates can cause good borrowers to switch to MFIs, 
therefore OLS estimation may give rise to biased and inconsistent estimates in the 
presence of reverse causality. Finding appropriate instrument(s) is extremely difficult. 
Number of MFIs delivering loan in a village could be a potential candidate but it is also 
very likely that MFIs chose to operate in villages where moneylenders charged higher 
interest rates. Therefore, this variable will not be an exogenous instrument. Changes in 
the incidence of females going out for work in last five years are also related to MFI 
coverage because increased number of females going out for work than before indicates 
less restrictions on them to join MFIs. It can also be an outcome of their past participation 
in MFIs. However, the F-statistics from the regression of MFI coverage on changes in 
females going out for work (three dummies are i) increased considerably, ii) increased 
marginally and iii) remained the same)) is very low suggesting that these instruments are 
weak which can potentially lead to more biased estimates (Stock, Wright and Yogo, 
2002).  
To address the problem, we estimate a system of the following two equations by 
3SLS:  
1 1 = _i i iInterML MFI Cover    1iδW     --- (3)  
          2 2_  = i i iMFI Cover InterML    2iψW   --- (4) 
where the 1iW  vector includes use of both MFI and moneylender loans, village level 
infrastructure, percentage of land irrigated using electricity, percentage of land that grows 
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one, two and three crops a year, and current poverty situation (and also the interaction 
terms in equation (2). These are the same variables included in equations (1) and (2).  
The MFI coverage is increasing with the number of MFIs working in a village 
even with overlapping of membership. Other determinants of MFI coverage are difficult 
to figure out because of scant empirical evidence.
10
 MFIs state their goal as to serve the 
poor and have some explicit criteria of selecting the participants (such that owning less 
that 50 decimal of land) but they do not disclose their criteria of selecting a location or 
community. It is now official that MFIs in Bangladesh failed to reach the extreme poor 
within a chosen community. Recognizing this problem BRAC has devised its CFPR/TUP 
program specifically tailored to serve the extreme poor. Amin, Rai and Topa (2003) and 
Rahman and Razzaque (2000) also confirm that MFIs do not always target the extreme 
poor.  
Gauri and Fruttero (2003) investigate the determinants of selecting a location by 
MFIs in Bangladesh. They find that MFIs expand credit programs in areas where they are 
not present, and they are not concerned whether other MFIs were already operating in a 
given area. They also find that poverty, community level well-being or landlessness were 
not significant for credit program expansion. This supports the opportunistic account of 
MFI behavior in which MFIs spread out to new locations because donors use coverage as 
an indicator of MFI efforts. They estimate a fixed effect model that accounts for the 
geographical or physical infrastructure but it is these fixed effects that might also be 
relevant to choose a location.  
Ravallion and Wodon (2000) find that geographic placement of Grameen Bank 
branches appears to be influenced by the potential gains from switching to rural nonfarm 
activities by the poor. Patterns of use of the MFI loans also give an indication about MFI 
coverage. More loan use in a particular sector indicates higher marginal product in that 
sector, and it is therefore likely that MFIs will expand credit programs in those villages 
having better opportunity to invest in those sectors. If the opportunistic account of MFI 
behavior is correct, MFIs will expand program where profitability of investment by 
borrowers is higher so that they can achieve high recovery rate. Nearly half of all loans 
                                                 
10
 Zaman (1997, p, 237-239) documents individual and household level characteristics that determines 
participation in BRAC‟s credit program such as ratio of earners to members, age and sex of the households 
head, and landownership. The village level data used in this paper cannot exploit this information. 
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disbursed by BRAC are utilized in certain agricultural activities such as crop production, 
irrigation, poultry and livestock rearing, fisheries, and food processing. Rural trading is 
the other important sector with 41.7% of all loans being utilized (Husain et al., 1998, p. 
30). It is expected that loans of other MFIs are also utilized in similar patterns. 
Profitability of many of these activities requires access to electricity and other 
infrastructural development. It has also been found that 69% of BRAC borrowers live in 
villages that have medium level infrastructural development (Husain et al., 1998, p. 30).  
Hence, many of the variables that influence moneylender interest rates also 
influence MFI coverage. The variables included in the 2iW  vector are village level 
infrastructure, percentage of land irrigated using electricity, percentage of land that grows 
one, two and three crops a year, and changes in the incidence of poverty in last five years. 
Current poverty (within a community or village) does not determine current level of 
participation in MFIs because current level of participation is a cumulative process with 
many old members who joined previously; rather it is the past incidences of poverty that 
determines current level of participation. Therefore, we include changes in the incidence 
of poverty in last five years in equation (4), while we include in equation (3) male and 
female wage rates which are proxies for current poverty. This is also necessary to satisfy 
the exclusion restrictions so that the system is not under-identified. We include changes 
in the incidence of females going out for work in last five years as additional instruments 
for MFI coverage in equation (3). For robustness check, competition among 
moneylenders (percentage of households owning no more than 10 decimal of land) is 
included in both equations. 
 
Insert Table 4 here 
 
Results for 3SLS estimation of the system are reported in Table 4.
11
 It is evident 
that the results do not meaningfully change from those estimated by OLS. Column 2a 
reports results for equation (3) without the interaction terms. The coefficients of MFI 
coverage and percentage of land irrigated with electricity enter positively and 
                                                 
11
 The results do not meaningfully change if changes in the incidence of females going out for work are not 
used as additional instruments. 
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significantly. The interaction terms are included in column 3a. This is our preferred 
specification as it corrects for endogeneity and incorporates interaction effects of MFI 
coverage with other relevant factors. As in OLS estimation, use of moneylender loan 
enters negatively and significantly, and its interaction with MFI coverage positively and 
significantly.  This reconfirms our previous result that moneylenders charge higher 
interest rates if loans are used in productive purposes in the villages where higher 
percentage of households borrow from MFIs.  
There is one important change in the results. Percentage of land under irrigation 
using electricity and its interaction with MFI coverage become insignificant. The reason 
is probably that the MFI borrowers are usually tenants and marginal landowners who are 
not able to take advantage of modern irrigation facilities because of diseconomies of 
scale.  In column 4a, competition among moneylenders is included as a robustness check. 
Results do not differ from those in column 3a. We find that competition drives down and 
higher distance from bazaar increases moneylender interest rates.  
The coefficient of MFI coverage is uniformly larger than that in comparable OLS 
regressions ranging from 1.2 to 1.9, and its significance level ranges from 5% to 10% 
level. In equation (4), moneylender interest rates predict MFI coverage (columns 3b and 
4b). Results are also robust to different combinations of variables in the two equations 
(not reported).  
 However, these results are based on village level data that lack information in the 
individual borrower level. Moneylenders may charge different interest rates to different 
borrowers in the same village based on individual borrower characteristics and loan size. 
It is worth mentioning that there may be possible multi-level sample selection bias in the 
household data (Iqbal, 1988). For example, X number of total households are surveyed 
out of which 1X X  are found to be borrowers, and only 2 1X X  borrow from 
moneylenders. If the analysis is restricted to the 2X  borrowers only, the results suffer 
from two sources of selection bias. If borrowing households are not randomly selected 
from the overall sample, which may not be unlikely, OLS regression does not distinguish 
between the behavioral function relating the interest rate to its determinants and the 
sample selection function relating the probability of borrowing to its determinants. 
Heckman (1979) correction can be employed to account for this, but there is another level 
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of sample selection bias. If moneylender clients are not randomly selected from the 
sample of borrowers, which may not again be unlikely, a similar statistical problem 
occurs. Village level data can avoid this econometric difficulty but at a cost. Nonetheless, 
it would be more informative to investigate using household data with duly addressing 
the econometric issues. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
This paper explores the impact of the MFI program expansion on the 
moneylender interest rates in the rural Bangladesh. It is found that moneylender interest 
rates go up with the percentage of households borrowing from MFIs. Productive 
investment of loan lowers moneylender interest rates. But MFI program expansion 
increases moneylender interest rates in the villages in which more loans are invested in 
productive economic activities. As loans are utilized in productive purposes, the 
likelihood of repayment increases so that moneylenders are able to charge lower interest 
rates. But if the overall demand for fund goes up as indicated by higher percentages 
borrowing from MFIs, and if MFI loan is inadequate or seasonal working capital is 
unavailable from MFIs, and repayment schedule is tight, borrowers will resort to 
moneylenders for additional fund to sustain their projects. Increased demand for fund will 
drive up moneylender interest rates. It is also found that competition among 
moneylenders lowers, and distance from place of commercial activities increases 
moneylender interest rates. Results are robust to correction for endogeneity. 
The results are potentially important for the policymakers. Borrowers can make 
more productive investments if MFIs meet their demand for loan by allowing more 
flexibility in loan disbursement and repayment schedule. Borrower projects will also be 
more profitable if MFIs expand their program of loan-only to loan-plus.
12
 In that case, 
moral hazard problem faced by moneylenders will be greatly reduced. Active presence of 
the moneylenders is not necessarily harmful and can even be beneficial if increasing 
competition between formal and informal lenders increases borrowers‟ access to funds at 
competitive interest rates.  
                                                 
12
 BRAC follows loan-plus approach, where loans are accompanied by various forms of assistance for the 
borrowers such as skill development training, provision of higher quality inputs and technical assistance as 
well as marketing for finished products.  
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the villages 
 
Number of MFI working in the village  3.9 (1.4)* 
(Min = 1, Max = 9) 
Number of big MFI working in the village  3.6 (1.3)* 
(Min = 1, Max = 8) 
Number of households in the village   548.3 (426.5)* 
(Min = 59, Max =2600) 
Number of households in the village with MFI membership 179.7 (148.0)*  
(Min = 6, Max = 775) 
% of households in the village with MFI membership 33 (19)* 
(Min = 1, Max = 96) 
Moneylender interest rate (annual %) 103.33 (59.06)* 
(Min = 10 Max = 240) 
Daily male wage rate (in Taka) 44.37 (8.26)* 
Daily female wage rate (in Taka) 30.09 (6.88)* 
Main use of MFI loan in productive investment  32.7% (48) 
Main use of Moneylender loan in productive investment  10.0% (13) 
Main use of Bank loan in productive investment  59.7% (80) 
In the last 5 years  
Poverty incidence in the village  
    Increased considerably 34.6% (53) 
    Increased marginally 21.6% (33) 
    Remained the same 17.0% (26) 
    Decreased  26.8% (41) 
Female going out of village for work  
    Increased considerably 21.6% (32) 
    Increased marginally 35.1% (52) 
    Remained the same 40.5% (60) 
    Decreased  2.7% (4) 
Agricultural day laborer   
    Increased considerably 33.5% (52) 
    Increased marginally 37.4% (58) 
    Remained the same 13.5% (21) 
    Decreased  15.5% (24) 
Households living on agricultural   
    Increased considerably 10.5% (16) 
    Increased marginally 9.9% (15) 
    Remained the same 55.3% (84) 
    Decreased  24.3% (37) 
Female day laborer  
    Increased considerably 30.7% (47) 
    Increased marginally 42.5% (65) 
    Remained the same 22.9% (35) 
    Decreased  3.9% (6) 
Figures in the parentheses are the number of villages except with asterisk (*).  
* Figures in the parentheses are standard deviations;  
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Table 2: OLS regression: Log of moneylender interest rate (InterML) is the 
dependent variable) 
 
Explanatory 
variables  
(2) (3) (4) (5) (4a) (5a) 
MFI_cover 1.109*** 
(0.241) 
1.092*** 
(0.256) 
1.006*** 
(0.298) 
0.850** 
(0.361) 
1.153*** 
(0.276) 
0.982** 
(0.336) 
UseML   -23.389 
(26.208) 
-24.158 
(32.151) 
-11.090 
(26.104) 
-30.095 
(34.607) 
-18.325 
(28.704) 
UseMFL  -14.273 
(12.591) 
-9.371 
(16.457) 
-11.819 
(15.506) 
-3.586 
(15.862) 
-6.373 
(14.914) 
Shop   0.056 
(0.082) 
0.043 
(0.087) 
0.051 
(0.090) 
0.040 
(0.095) 
DisBank   0.203 
(2.227) 
0.711 
(1.501) 
0.043 
(2.123) 
0.722 
(1.516) 
DisBazaar   7.060 
(4.807) 
6.392 
(4.438) 
9.177* 
(4.727) 
7.810* 
(4.352) 
DisBus   0.639 
(1.519) 
-0.762 
(1.216) 
0.627 
(1.592) 
-0.750 
(1.289) 
DisRoad   -2.529 
(3.545) 
-3.489 
(3.304) 
-1.987 
(3.439) 
-3.005 
(3.286) 
Electr   27.885 
(40.803) 
-20.148 
(48.448) 
12.342 
(41.552) 
-30.802 
(47.429) 
ElectIri   0.454** 
(0.183) 
0.376** 
(0.172) 
0.530*** 
(0.179) 
0.436** 
(0.176) 
Crop1   -0.686 
(1.331) 
-0.173 
(1.207) 
-0.614 
(1.327) 
-0.128 
(1.210) 
Crop2   -0.709 
(1.097) 
-0.263 
(1.069) 
-0.722 
(1.129) 
-0.290 
(1.093) 
Crop3   -0.638 
(1.245) 
0.158 
(1.220) 
-0.589 
(1.282) 
0.188 
(1.247) 
MaleWage   0.144 
(1.451) 
 -0.101 
(1.428) 
 
FemWage   1.124 
(1.620) 
 1.226 
(1.586) 
 
PovCon    -39.784** 
(16.631) 
 -33.940** 
(16.088) 
PovSli    8.424 
(15.251) 
 11.591 
(14.397) 
PovSam    -1.758 
(21.884) 
 -0.920 
(21.174) 
Landcon_10     -217.36* 
(110.584) 
-183.520 
(111.091) 
R-square 0.144 0.172 0.310 0.329 0.354 0.358 
Sample size 106 106 89 94 89 94 
 
Figures in the parentheses are White (1980) corrected robust standard errors. All regressions include a 
constant. *** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level.   
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Table 3: OLS regression: Log of moneylender interest rate (InterML) is the 
dependent variable) 
 
Explanatory 
variables  
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
MFI_cover 1.398*** 
(0.353) 
1.196*** 
(0.313) 
1.185*** 
(0.322) 
1.061*** 
(0.300) 
1.085*** 
(0.307) 
UseML  -182.270*** 
(44.691) 
-169.746*** 
(45.534) 
-207.682*** 
(43.276) 
-194.407*** 
(46.286) 
-197.799*** 
(44.437) 
UseMFL -16.857 
(30.681) 
-35.661 
(29.656) 
-18.703 
(28.170) 
-35.884 
(27.011) 
-30.276 
(26.473) 
MFI_cover* UseML 4.768*** 
(0.961) 
4.408*** 
(0.924) 
5.411*** 
(1.009) 
4.951*** 
(0.953) 
5.308*** 
(1.029) 
MFI_cover* UseMFL -0.014 (0.664) 0.462 (0.696) 0.287 (0.599) 0.692 (0.601) 0.576 (0.620) 
Shop 0.121 (0.087) 0.160* (0.090) 0.107 (0.097) 0.149 (0.101) 0.154 (0.104) 
DisBank -0.394 (2.118) 0.167 (1.417) -0.622 (1.974) 0.118 (1.435) -0.662 (1.973) 
DisBazaar 7.926 (4.920) 8.483** 
(4.397) 
10.024** 
(4.771) 
9.874** 
(4.313) 
11.144** 
(4.657) 
DisBus 0.953 (1.428) -1.108 (1.348) 1.360 (1.351) -0.893 (1.320) -0.087 (1.444) 
DisRoad -1.830 (3.378) -2.101 (2.916) -1.762 (3.183) -2.256 (2.878) -1.267 (2.872) 
Electr 51.631 
(40.690) 
9.988 (47.336) 30.751 
(38.538) 
-2.278 
(44.017) 
13.631 
(41.795) 
ElectIri 0.969*** 
(0.284) 
1.182*** 
(0.300) 
0.817*** 
(0.265) 
1.066*** 
(0.280) 
1.046*** 
(0.282) 
MFI_cover* ElectIri -0.016** 
(0.007) 
-0.021*** 
(0.006) 
-0.008 (0.007) -0.015*** 
(0.006) 
-0.014** 
(0.007) 
Crop1 -0.695 (1.379) -0.073 (1.202) -0.555 (1.364) 0.002 (1.213) -0.208 (1.399) 
Crop2 -0.701 (1.154) -0.267 (1.092) -0.708 (1.174) -0.277 (1.121) -0.448 (1.253) 
Crop3 -0.569 (1.292) 0.340 (1.225) -0.591 (1.312) 0.337 (1.255) -0.103 (1.363) 
MaleWage 0.589 (1.292)  0.563 (1.190)  0.117 (1.199) 
FemWage 0.027 (1.488)  0.312 (1.363)  -0.244 (1.430) 
PovCon  -43.346*** 
(15.562) 
 -36.288** 
(15.447) 
-32.519* 
(17.897) 
PovSli  9.980 (14.142)  14.796 
(13.669) 
15.509 
(14.371) 
PovSam  -20.074 
(20.680) 
 -16.634 
(19.602) 
-12.472 
(19.350) 
Landcon_10   -269.987*** 
(88.669) 
-224.771** 
(92.642) 
-235.068** 
(90.007) 
R-square 0.408 0.449 0.464 0.486 0.514 
Sample size 89 94 89 94 89 
 
Figures in the parentheses are White (1980) corrected robust standard errors.  All regressions include a 
constant. *** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level.   
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Table 4: System estimation (Equation (3): InterML is the dependent variable; 
Equation (4): MFI_cover is the dependent variable) 
 
Explanatory 
variables  
(2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b) 
 Equation (3) Equation (4) Equation (3) Equation (4) Equation (3) Equation (4) 
MFI_cover 1.212** (0.595)  1.872* (0.982)  1.689* (0.959)  
InterML  -0.002 (0.147)  0.241*** 
(0.082) 
 0.255*** 
(0.070) 
MFIno  3.407** (1.497)  2.032 (1.340)  1.760 (1.357) 
UseML -24.058 (20.425)  -106.198** (45.559)  -117.422*** (42.489)  
UseMFL -9.851 (12.915)  -29.519 (23.094)  -29.230 (22.180)  
MFI_cover* 
UseML 
  2.775** (1.293)  3.059** (1.201)  
MFI_cover* 
UseMFL 
  0.491 (0.681)  0.686 (0.691)  
Shop 0.063 (0.116) -0.027 (0.042) 0.104 (0.113) -0.024 (0.041) 0.083 (0.107) -0.020 (0.041) 
DisBank 0.283 (2.052) -0.265 (0.718) -0.111 (1.881) -0.155 (0.712) -0.496 (1.780) .0069458   
.7019841 
DisBazaar 7.275** (3.685) -0.534 (1.595) 7.990** (3.551) -1.946 (1.363) 10.937*** (3.383) -3.032*** 
(1.402) 
DisBus 0.424 (1.718) 0.749 (0.561) -0.139 (1.696) 0.444 (0.550) 0.449 (1.615) 0.262 (0.544) 
DisRoad -1.826 (4.241) -1.762 (1.549) 0.730 (4.131) -0.919 (1.415) 0.788 (3.907) -1.055 (1.375) 
Electr 25.892 (55.261) 5.804 (19.742) 48.335 (51.401) -6.588 (19.416) 21.604 (49.040) -0.739 (19.185) 
ElectIri 0.431** (0.194) 0.129 (0.100) 0.517 (0.425) 0.013 (0.077) 0.431 (0.415) -0.034 (0.076) 
MFI_cover* 
ElectIri 
  -0.007 (0.012)  -0.0003 (0.012)  
Crop1 -0.700 (0.672) 0.171 (0.244) -0.870 (0.627) 0.350 (0.238) -0.695 (0.597) 0.309 (0.234) 
Crop2 -0.672 (0.518) -0.146 (0.205) -0.583 (0.475) 0.077 (0.189) -0.629 (0.449) 0.116 (0.185) 
Crop3 -0.589 (0.624) -0.128 (0.227) -0.504 (0.592) 0.089 (0.215) -0.534 (0.559) 0.101 (0.211) 
MaleWage 0.126 (1.127)  0.272 (0.866)  0.267 (0.789)  
FemWage 1.176 (1.288)  0.271 (1.007)  0.457 (0.938)  
PovCon  -10.263 (7.982)  -5.285 (5.405)  -4.384 (4.813) 
PovSli  2.548 (6.033)  1.181 (4.636)  1.524 (4.490) 
PovSam  -17.873*** 
(6.014) 
 -12.495** 
(4.863) 
 -10.392** 
(4.658) 
Landcon_10     -330.837*** (91.209) 88.202** 
(32.415) 
Sample size 89 89 89 89 89 89 
 
Figures in the parentheses are standard errors. All regressions include a constant. *** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 
5% level, * Significant at the 10% level. 
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Appendix  
 
List of variables 
Variable Name Notation  
Average moneylender interest rate (log) InterML 
Percentage of households borrowing from MFI (log) MFI_cover 
Number of MFIs delivering loan in the village MFIno 
Main use of moneylenders loan (1 = investment, 0 = 
otherwise) 
UseML 
Main use of MFI loan (1 = investment, 0 = 
consumption) 
UseMFL 
Number of shops in the village Shop 
Distance from the nearest Bank DisBank 
Distance from the nearest Bazaar DisBazaar 
Distance from the nearest Bus stop DisBus 
Distance from the nearest all weather (pucca) road DisRoad 
Percentage of houses with electricity connection Electr 
Percentage of land irrigated with electricity ElectIri 
Percentage of land with one crop Crop1 
Percentage of land with two crops Crop2 
Percentage of land with three crops Crop3 
Average daily male wage rate (in Taka) MaleWage 
Average daily female wage rate (in Taka) FemWage 
In last 5 years incidence of poverty in the village has   
               Increased considerably PovCon 
               Increased slightly PovSli 
               Remained the same  PovSam 
Percentage of households owning no more than 10 
decimal of land 
Landcon_10 
 
 
